The second problem for Eisenhower's, and perhaps more pressing was the logistical problem. Something had to be done about the long supply lines. The fuel shortages and insufficient transportation had to be dealt with first. The Allies were receiving supplies through the beaches of Normandy but there was a shortage of trucks to transport the necessities to the armies. The deteriorating weather was making unloading the supplies on the landing beaches almost impossible. Ike urgently required a deep-water port to move supplies to the battlefront. Additionally, as the Germans moved back they destroyed most of shipping infrastructure on the coastal harbors.
The regular wrangling and competition amongst Ike's generals aggravated the situation. Other Generals profiled Montgomery as difficult. His pitch for a single thrust operation strengthened the animosity feelings. Montgomery ceaselessly complained to Ike about the quantity of supplies his soldiers received. He was constantly pressing for precedence on fuel and ammunition.
After Ike assumed personal command of the ground operations in Europe, the state of affairs deteriorated. A divisive command problem arose out of this decision. Montgomery could not be appointed the Supreme Allied forces commander due to political reasons. This was despite the fact that he was a distinguished military leader with experience from not only North Africa but also in Overlord. Montgomery wanted to be appointed the ground armies commander and lobbied Ike hard for the same. Eisenhower chose to retain the duty and as such, he continually met open defiance from Montgomery and a few number of his British Generals. Montgomery imagined that he was a more qualified commander and for this together with the command and control issue, antagonistically opposed Eisenhower on almost all-tactical decisions. This explicit contempt created a lot more tension, distrust, and turmoil in the Allied camp. Up until now, a very patient Eisenhower never acted on Montgomery. It was after Market Garden commenced that he threatened to escalate the issue to Marshall and Churchill. Montgomery's Chief of Staff at last settled the matter before Ike escalated it hence sparing Montgomery the sack.
General Eisenhower approved to the Montgomery plan on 4 September after review. This was in part an attempt to calm and tone down the belligerent Montgomery and chiefly as after realization that it was a chance for him to seize a deep-water port. The Market Garden plan was audacious and risky. It was uncharacteristic of the usually conservative Montgomery. After the approval, Ike provided General Montgomery with semi permanent fuel and ammunition supply priority. He then moved the US 1st Army commanded by General Hodges to the British southern line, until Antwerp was secured by the Allies. He wanted the remaining Nazi resistance on the ports of Antwerp and Le Havre cleared. This would give his forces the vital deep-water ports, hence considerably reducing the time of delivery for important war reserve resources to the front line forces.
The sustainment essential for the next stage of the operations, that is, the march into Germany and the seizure of Berlin, had to be covered. This was dependent upon successful capture of a port with a capacity of supporting a force of over two million men. Antwerp was the only European port capable of that. Montgomery was incensed with the proposal of a double thrust, which incorporated the Saar valley. On September 4, Montgomery captured the port of Antwerp. Ike then, against the wishes of his staff, allowed Montgomery to move into Belgium without clearing the pockets of Nazi resistance in Scheldt Estuary. He was also convinced by Montgomery to permit Market Garden to go ahead as scheduled instead of delaying the operation to clear the port as was proposed by Bradley and Patton.
The Operation
On 17 September, in the afternoon, Operation Market Garden commenced. The American 101st airborne division parachuted on the southern end while the American 82nd Airborne dropped to the north and attacked the Waal River Bridge at Nijmegen. The British First Airborne division together with the Polish brigade attacked their target, the bridges at Arnhem, further north. After all the three airborne divisions were on the ground, the British XXX Corps embarked on their assault and drove up the road. It was estimated that the XXX Corps would take no more than 3 days to arrive at the British at Arnhem. For the previous Allied airborne operations, drop zones for the paratroopers and gliders were as a rule of thumb as close to the target as could be so to elicit maximum surprise and to allow the enemy less reaction time to recover. The American drop zones for this offensive were no different. However, the British First airborne drop zones were far away from the target, i.e., the crucial bridges. They wanted to circumvent taking casualties to their planes by flying over what they imagined might be anti-aircraft guns concentration in the area. The bridges were in built-up zones so gliders could of course not land. Additionally the ground to the south of the bridges was imagined by the British generals to be too soft for gliders - entirely discounting the fact that the Polish paratroopers would be dropping in the very same zone later.
The drop zone selections led to the landing of some paratroopers of the First Airborne on top of the Nazi 10th SS Panzer Division. After landing, divisional radio sets were found to be tuned into the wrong frequencies. This made radio communication between units impossible. A small part of the British troopers’ contingent took the main Arnhem highway bridge on the north end. However, intense battle barred reinforcement for this small force. On the southern end of the river, the ninth SS Panzer controlled the bridge’s other end. Finally, the small British army at the bridge gave way to the superior Nazi forces. The rest of the division resiliently hung on in a small pocket on the river’s north a few miles away from the bridge. The polish troopers who parachuted on the south side of the river could not provide any significant backing. They merely fought to save their lives against the now fully alerted Nazi forces.
The first day was aeronautically splendid for an airdrop. As the days went on, the weather conditions deteriorated. The second wave was unable to drop for a further four more days. To the south, the first gains of the 82nd and 101st divisions Grave and Nijmegen seized bridges with minimal losses. The American 82nd Airborne took the Nijmegen Bridge the execution of an audacious river crossing in collapsible boats to assault and seize the bridge from the back. However, the XXX Corps joined them after number of days had passed. The highway connecting the bridges up to Arnhem steadily under counter attack by the Nazi forces and this caused many delays. Sections of this highway, to make matters worse, resembled an island on a dike and had with no maneuvering room. A single shot that took out the lead tank in a column could lead a delay going on for hours. Adequate infantry was not allocated to escort the tanks that were in the leading columns. It was taken that the American paratroopers would take up this task. However, the Americans had their own worries of keeping the corridor free of the Nazi attacks. This compromised the progress of XXX Corps after they crossed the Nijmegen Bridge and came to deal with the "island road". More infantry was required; however, it was just not obtainable. As a result, XXX Corps assault stalled. The British First Airborne, on their part, just a few miles away across the river, was being chewed to bits. In time, the British First Airborne had to be withdrawn and evacuated from their front on the Lower Rhine through an audacious night rescue operation.
The intention to oust the Nazi and perhaps end the Second World War by charismas had gone up in smoke. After nine days of fierce battle, the Allies withdrew. Incapable of rescuing their captured personnel, a large number of casualties and prisoners had to be forsaken.
The Final Analysis
The outcome rendered the Market Garden a nonviable operation. The objective was attainable but the strategy was full of flaws. For starters, the idea ended up to be hard one. The planners imagined that seizing the bridges would be as easy the seizure of the French bridges. Montgomery and the Allies, however, misjudged the incredible tenacity of Hitler and his Nazi army. Intelligence reports that Hitler soldiers along the Alhert Canal in Belgium, the Siegfried Line and in Arnhem had re-armed were received but disregarded by Montgomery. Additionally, Eisenhower was informed about the Nazi fortification; however, he did not personally challenge the plan on the bases of the intelligence reports. Alternatively, he opted to send Bedell Smith to Montgomery. Montgomery laughed of the idea of the aim was difficult simply for the reason that there were reports of Nazi tank potency at Arnhem. He would hear nothing about revising Market Garden . Montgomery did not realize that there was a terrain and topography variation between the lower Rhine and France. This meant the fact that a similar operation succeeded in France did not imply it would succeed in Holland. Roads were usually constricted and constructed on top of dikes. Road sections that were not raised flooded regularly slowing movements due to the clay mud. Additionally, the swampy, muddy land made maneuvering of the heavy gear hard. Ignoring his staff’s counsel and Dempsey's apprehension for a well-timed meeting with the paratroopers, Montgomery stubbornly pushed forward.
Had intelligence report been paid attention to, the operation may perhaps have been discontinued or at least deferred. The narrow corridor did not afford Dempsey much room for maneuver and restricted his flexibility and ability to pull a surprise. In addition, the strategy was devoid of any air component except fighter escort and gliders transports. Modest coalition coordination was exercised in the preparation for operation Market Garden. Montgomery simply passed on the plan to his men for implementation. When Major General Maxwell Taylor voiced his oppositions to the landing zone for his men, Montgomery replied that was too late for the plan to be changed. Major Gen Roy Urquhart met the same lack of cooperation . The strategy employed presumed that enough petroleum and ammunition would be available to carry out the plan. Montgomery was interested more in Bradley and Patton's fuel instead of taking the time to drive out the Nazi from the Scheldt Estuary. Seizing Scheldt would have opened up Antwerp to supplies for the Allied. Further, Bradley and Patton's to the south could have diverted the Nazi manpower and resources and that would support Ike's extensive front approach.
Not only was the strategy flawed, the resources were inadequate too. First, it was tactically naïve and logistically erroneous to move through Antwerp without weakening pockets of Nazi resistance. The Nazi fight back proved heavy more so in the Scheldt Estuary, the key North Sea access. This barrier was not removed until November 1944. The failure to do so deprived the Allies of the badly required deep-water port. This reduced logistics lines and it was a blow to any more operations in Germany’s interior. The inability to get rid of resistance also hindered Dempsey's movement since he had to reroute combat troops to guard his flank.
The airdrop was logistically hindered by having inadequate aircraft (transport and glider) to make a single jump as Montgomery's plan called for. The First Airborne even lacked sufficient radios for communication within themselves. When the second wave finally arrived, it was ill equipped to deal with the Panzer SS toughened threat. Bad weather caused the second wave delay foiling their plans of landing on D-Day. Though the weather conditions were fine for the first drop, it caused resupply and reinforcements delays for the Arnhem troops. The Germans took advantage of the poor weather exploiting the time to reinforce their manpower and other resources to respond to the Allies. As such, the aspect of Market Garden considered being the operation strength, the crack paratroopers, ended up limiting the Allied success severely. Montgomery's casual outlook toward the opposition meant the failure of the most effective tool available to the Operation. It is incomprehensible why Montgomery chose to pay no attention to his brilliant and experienced men. He casually dismissed justifiable issues raised by experienced infantry and airborne officers. Major General Stanislaw Sosabowski articulated his fears to Montgomery that the plan to land his troops at Arnhem was catastrophic and that higher-ranking officers were culpable of reckless overconfidence . Officers could do nothing to change his position and only sat in quiet frustration and follow orders. The only officer reputed to be capable of swaying Montgomery, Major General Freddie De Guingand, was outside Europe.
It is important to point out that even though Montgomery was seen to be arrogant, it might have been with a good reason. He had been commanding ground forces during triumphant North African operation and Operation Overlord. To be fair to Montgomery, the Allies as a group exhibited this same overconfidence. They had been calmed into this joint cockiness and arrogance due to the swiftness with which their conquest came. The excitement of the operation led men to calm down extremely. Exhaustion and loss of focus started creeping on the mission. As evidenced by the consequent preparation and logistical shortfalls of the operation, the intelligence was misleading and gave the impression that the Nazi were severely weakened. With no sense of pressure, acute fatigue, and the consequent loss of focus, situations came up where troops moved with insufficient resources. The impetus and thrilling buoyancy by the Allied victories changed the force from what would have been a success, into an exaggerated and unfocused bunch thereby sustaining major and avoidable losses of gear and personnel.
The strategy demanded the army to grab the initiative and hit speedily and surprise the worn out and inadequately prepared Nazi. Hitler, in hindsight, had correctly expected that Montgomery would head north to the Zuider Zee. He countered by placing Field Marshall Walter Model, his strongest general, in that front. Model at once lined up troops and started efforts to re-arm for the expected battle. He coordinated strategic barricading of highways and canals, and took the advantage of the weather and the Allies lack of the capacity to resupply and reinforce. He not only was able to hold the Arnhem Bridge, but also the city. His vigor and organizational brilliance were the reason the Nazi was able to hold off Market Garden.
To sum up this misadventure, the timing required to scheme a speedy thrust was uncoordinated due to the unanticipated fight back by committed Nazi soldiers; the failure to drop the second batch of paratroopers owing to bad weather; the utter disregard with which intelligence reports were met with; and the poor communication. A combination of these factors created the worst Allied defeats of the time.
Lessons from the defeat
Operation Market Garden, without a doubt the biggest paratroop drop of its time, was also one of the most terrible operational failures. What strategy, or lack of it, could have resulted to such an unbelievable failure for the Allies? What lessons learned can apply to the contemporary and future military operations? Some timeless lessons are evident from the operations’ analysis:
The first lesson applies at the strategic level. That it is necessary for military planners to stay focused on the political causes of a war. They must by no means lose sight of the political motivation of the primary conflict. The states political will and national interests will always play a major role in the coalition strategy development. For the reason that the US contributed the greater part of machinery, manpower, and finances to the Allied war effort, Eisenhower's appointment ahead of Montgomery as the ultimate Allied Commander was logical. He was always sensitive to political and higher-ranking military bosses, above all Roosevelt, Churchill, and Marshall. His focus was completely on the Allies’ goal of "total surrender." A skilled professional, Eisenhower never allowed the egoistical and individual aspirations of any of his generals sidetrack him from trying to realize that goal. He took note and considered Montgomery's views and thoughts but remained the designer of the multi-pronged assault tactic.
On the operational level, two lessons can be learned from the Market Garden operation defeat. First, planning and coordinating fully with all elements of an operation is of fundamental importance for the successful implementation of any plan. Whether these elements are ground or air their coordination is necessary for the plan to be executed successfully. In the Market Garden operation, planners, for example, did not consider the fighter or bomber cover or ground bombing to weaken the target area prior to the airdrop. Additionally, no one reviewed the plan when Montgomery got information that there were inadequate transport aircraft to see through the drop on day one. Definitely there would have been a change in the plan had fighter together with transport planning expertise been incorporated in initial and ensuing planning. Secondly, it can be learned that logistics shortages caused and can still cause the troops to be un-prepared. Port of Antwerp opening, or delay by a few days could have probably alleviated the occurrence of debacles like the delivery of the inappropriate ammunition and the shortage of working radios. A wholly coordinated plan combined with better logistical support might have had a different result.
The most important lesson that can be learned emerges at the tactical level. Commanders must learn to understand their soldiers and recognize their worries and concerns. They must be able to analyze their collective behavior and be prepared to step in to keep them focused on the eventual goal, that is, the completion of the operation satisfactorily. Without taking a break, Dempsey's soldiers had marched since Overlord, traversing through Northwestern France and fighting very tough resistance. Logistics and supply channels could barely be kept up. The resulting effect was severe food, shelter, and ammunitions shortages. A disadvantage of the Allies haste in pushing the Nazis back manifested itself as arrogance and over-confidence in the troops. Focus on the primary mission was lost, a development that proved to be catastrophic. Reading and understanding the troops is a basic aspect of a solid leadership even in the contemporary times.
Finally, from a leadership perspective, the lesson that great leaders must be ready to forfeit their own ambitions to support the unit efforts and the triumphant completion of the mission is drawn. Eisenhower and Montgomery, though accomplished soldiers, were miles apart in leadership style and personality. Eisenhower, the Allied supreme Commander, appreciated the political consequences and sensitivities of the Allies alliance. Montgomery, on the contrary, as the legendary leader of Overlord only saw the British viewpoint and failed to appreciate the shared command. He could not appreciate why the USA, being the major provider of both financial and materiel and the manpower support, was not willing to let the British lead the Allied attack on Berlin. He did not appreciate that had the USA, having provided all those resources, allowed him to act on his way and yet fail, it could have led to a crisis in the Allies camp.
Confusion and dissention amid the Allied top command created troubles as well. Montgomery openly disagreed with Ike on issues such as the suitability of a single thrust vice broad front strategy and the presence of a ground forces commander. He was critical of Ike's tactical verdicts and directives in the strongest possible terms. He did so in a very defiant manner that Ike was obligated to interrupt. Many junior commanders in the Allied forces were of the opinion that Montgomery's actions justified removal. Eisenhower, nonetheless, in full realization that he was indebted to listen to the British Allies, did not remove him. He held that he needed to let Montgomery have his right to express his views fully. Though this shows the sensitivity of Eisenhower to the Allied coalition, it frustrated other Allied generals.
The failure by Montgomery to take full advantage of his staff’s talents and to seek advice from with his fellow general on Market Garden planning show him as a solitary thinker and that he had tendencies of not seeking his staff’s assistance in developing operational plans. On the other hand, Ike consulted his troops and regularly shared with his field commanders on their plan’s operational implications. He worked in concert with his staff to solve problems and outlined the solution to General George Marshall and Prime Minister Winston Churchill frequently prior to their implementation. It is almost incomprehensible why Montgomery did not synchronize with the airborne commanders or ask for fighter support alongside the transport escort. A coordination between him and his peers would have averted loses through communicating with each other to contain the logistical failures or a realignment of transport and combat resources to avail sufficient numbers for the accomplishment of the mission.
It is evident that leadership styles and personalities were a major cause of the Market Garden failure. Pride and national interests, together with military considerations, determine success or lack of it in any operation. The Operation Market Garden’s lessons are universal and timeless. They are a forewarning to leaders at any organizational level. Be it an emergency operation or a full-blown conflict, these valuable lessons must form the foundation by which leaders will be developed to lead the operation and form a successful strategy.
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